

# Enhancing global preparedness against nuclear and radiological terrorism: strategies for strengthening nuclear security and expectations for nuclear forensics

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# Nuclear security: a national responsibility

Nuclear security focuses on the prevention and detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorized acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities or associated activities



**The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with that State**



# The IAEA's role in nuclear security

## The IAEA:

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- implements specific activities outlined in the Nuclear Security Plans
- supports States, upon request, in their efforts to establish and maintain effective nuclear security through assistance in capacity building, guidance or standards, human resources development and risk reduction
- facilitates adherence to implementation of international legal instruments related to nuclear security



# Examples of potential nuclear security events

- Theft or unauthorized removal of nuclear or other radioactive material, or
- Sabotage of facilities or transports with nuclear material

With intent to:

- Construct an improvised nuclear device
- Construct a radiological dispersal device (RDD) or radiological exposure device (RED)
- Commit other malicious or unlawful acts

## POTENTIAL CONSEQUENCES



Health



Environmental



Economic



Societal



# Nuclear security – the reality

## IAEA's Incident and Trafficking Database (ITDB) Factsheet 2025

Group I: incidents that are, or are likely to be, connected with trafficking or malicious use

Group II: incidents of undetermined intent

Group III: incidents that are not, or are unlikely to be, connected with trafficking or malicious use





## How nuclear forensics contributes to strengthening nuclear security

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# Nuclear Security Recommendations on Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material out of Regulatory Control

A State should be able to...

- 1 Notify the competent authorities
- 2 Assess the validity and potential consequences of the nuclear security event
- 3 Locate, identify, **categorize and characterize** nuclear and other radioactive material
- 4 Secure such material and apply other response measures appropriate to the nuclear security event, such as neutralization of the device
- 5 Recover, detain, and/or seize and place such material under regulatory control
- 6 Collect, preserve, store, transport and **analyze evidence, including the application of nuclear forensics measures**, related to a criminal act, or an unauthorized act, with nuclear security implications that involve such material
- 7 Apprehend and subsequently prosecute or extradite alleged offenders





# The role of nuclear forensics in nuclear security

## Nuclear forensics

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The **examination of nuclear or other radioactive material**, or of evidence that is contaminated with radionuclides, in the context of legal proceedings under international or national law related to nuclear security



Primarily a **laboratory-based** capability, but usually with an **in-field component**



Usually performed by **technical/scientific personnel**, overseen by the State investigative authority





# Nuclear forensics allows States to



**Prosecute and convict** criminal smugglers and traffickers of nuclear and other radioactive material



**Deter potential acts** by malicious actors through a credible mechanism of determining accountability



**Identify gaps and weaknesses** in a State's nuclear security regime

**In-field responders**



**Laboratory scientists**

**AN INCIDENT OCCURS**



Successful implementation of radiological crime scene management



Successful performance of a nuclear forensic examination



Successful prosecution

# The deterrent effect of nuclear forensics

Nuclear forensics can be used by a State to assist determination of whether the nuclear or radiological material came from a State's materials holdings or not


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If **from** the State's own materials holdings



- Nuclear forensics can be used to determine from which facility in the State from which it escaped regulatory control
- Nuclear forensic data can also aid criminal aspects of the investigation

If **not from** the State's own materials holdings



- Nuclear forensics can be used to indicate that its origin might lie outside of the State
- Could indicate cross-border smuggling of nuclear or radioactive material



## How the IAEA assists States in the development of nuclear forensics capabilities

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*International cooperation  
and the development of  
human resources*

# Goal

To ensure that States have a nuclear forensic and radiological crime scene management (RCSM) capability commensurate with their nuclear security needs and requirements



# Objectives

To assist States in developing and sustaining the technical and associated capabilities necessary to perform RCSM and nuclear forensic examinations in support of investigations into criminal or intentional unauthorized or suspected acts involving nuclear or other radioactive material


To develop nuclear forensics and RCSM nationally, regionally and globally through collaboration with Member States and international organizations engaged in capacity building efforts in this area





# NSNS's programme of Member State assistance in nuclear forensics

## *A very brief history*



NSS No. 22-G

*Radiological Crime Scene  
Management*

NSS No. 2-G

*Nuclear Forensics in  
Support of Investigations*

# Publications

↖ Member state consensus publications



↘ TECDOC publications (not Member State guidance)



Technical information  
on nuclear forensics

IAEA-TECDOC-2019

*Establishing a Nuclear Forensic Capability:  
Application of Analytical Techniques*

IAEA-TDL-009

*Development of a National Nuclear  
Forensics Library*

Information from  
technical meetings

IAEA-TECDOC-1896

*Nuclear Forensics: Beyond the Science*

Results from Member  
State CRP projects

**Coming  
soon!**

*New TECDOC*

*Applying Nuclear Forensic Science to  
Respond to a Nuclear Security Event*

IAEA-TECDOC-1820


*Identification of High Confidence Nuclear  
Forensic Signatures*

IAEA-TECDOC-1730

*Application of Nuclear Forensics in  
Combating Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and  
Other Radioactive Material*



# IAEA training programme in nuclear forensics (and radiological crime scene management)



## Example #1

# The Integrated Workshop on Radiological Crime Scene Management and Nuclear Forensics

- ➔ Hosted at the IAEA's Nuclear Security Training and Demonstration Centre
- ➔ Designed for experts in nuclear forensics and radiological crime scene management to learn from each other and to practice key methods



## Example #2

# The Long-term Training Programme in Nuclear Forensics



### A placement programme

Technical and scientific personnel, identified by the recipient Member State through official channels and selected by the IAEA, travels to a host Member State for a period of three or more months

In the host Member State, technical personnel will:

- Complete a scientific project focused on a specialization in MORC
- Learn the means by which nuclear security activities are conducted in the host Member State more generally

### An opportunity to collaborate

In addition to learning how to conduct key nuclear security activities from experienced personnel, the host and recipient Member States can build the foundation of a lasting collaboration

The output of a Nuclear Security Fellowship not only benefits the recipient Member State, but also the host Member State






# Current CRP – J02020

## *Nuclear Forensics Science to Bridge the Radiological Crime Scene to the Nuclear Forensics Laboratory*

- ✓ 19 participating Member States
- ✓ Set to run until 1 October 2026
- ✓ 12 “specific objectives” in RCSM and nuclear forensics targeted



## Previous CRP – J02001

*Application of Nuclear Forensics in Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear and other Radioactive Materials*

## Previous CRP – J02003

*Identification of High Confidence Nuclear Forensics Signatures for the Development of National Nuclear Forensics Libraries*

## Previous CRP – J02013

*Applying Nuclear Forensic Signatures to Respond to a Nuclear Security Event*



# Strengthening nuclear security resilience

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*The role of nuclear forensics*



# We must remain ever vigilant to the misuse of nuclear and radioactive materials

- ➔ Malicious actors continue to seek nuclear and radioactive material with the potential to be used in the construction of radiological dispersal devices and improvised nuclear devices
- ➔ The continued growth and expansion of nuclear power globally requires the international community to deploy all means at our disposal to minimize this risk

**Nuclear forensics remains an essential tool for States to investigate incidents of material out of regulatory control that occur within their borders**





# States require nuclear forensic capabilities commensurate with their needs and requirements

- ➔ Not all States require advanced capabilities in nuclear forensics, though States with nuclear facilities usually do
- ➔ International cooperation is necessary for States to develop sustainable and resilient nuclear forensics capabilities
- ➔ States with advanced nuclear forensic capabilities have a leadership role to play, assisting newcomer States

**The IAEA stands ready to assist all States in the development of nuclear forensics capabilities commensurate with their needs and requirements**





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**Thank you!**

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